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Recognizing Constitutional Freedoms in the 
Public Schools: Reasserting State and Local 
Educational Policy and Practice 
through Non-Judicial Law 
Matthew Hilton· 
This article describes how statutes affinning the role of 
academic freedom, freedom of conscience and student 
expression in the public school were adopted and implemented 
in the State of Utah. 1 These experiences suggest that with 
carefully defined legal and political consensus, states can 
articulate and clarify educational policy within the parameters 
of current constitutional interpretations by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CONFUSION IN UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT OPINIONS REGARDING ASSUMPTIONS AND PHILOSOPHY 
ABOUT EDUCATION 
In 1940, the United States Supreme Court issued a full 
memorandum opm10n regarding conflict between state 
curriculum practices and the provisions of the free exercise 
clause of the First Amendment.2 The Court ruled that 
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1. The entire statutory text is included as Appendix A to this article; the 
regulations are found in Appendix B. 
2. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows: 
"Congress shall pass no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or 
the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for 
redress of grievances." The "establishment" phrase generally refers to the wording 
1 
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although the pledge of allegiance violated students' religious 
convictions, a state government could require students enrolled 
in public schools to pledge allegiance to the flag. 3 Three years 
later, with a nearly identical factual pattern, the Supreme 
Court reversed itself and prohibited the practice of requiring 
students to pledge allegiance to the flag in public schools when 
the practice was against their religious convictions.4 
However laudable the result of Barnette may be, the 
changes in philosophical assumptions to justify the result may 
not be. Both opinions applied radically different assumptions 
regarding the nature of education and constitutional 
adjudication. For example, as to the process of constitutional 
adjudication, the two opinions expressed significantly different 
assumptions regarding the judicial deference due legislative 
determinations, the role of science in constitutional 
determinations, and the purpose of the Bill of Rights. 
Regarding the structure and nature of education, the two 
opinions announced different assumptions over the role that 
the family played in reinforcing or opposing what was taught in 
the school and the processes by which students internalized 
moral and citizenship education. Even though the Court 
announced it was applying identical constitutional provisions, 
beginning its analysis from mutually exclusive assumptions 
naturally led the two opinions to completely different 
conclusions about the source of liberty in a free society and the 
desired outcome of education.5 
Like the 1940 and 1943 decisions, modern Supreme Court 
opinions regarding First Amendment constitutional constraints 
on public school curriculum offer some clarity as to result, but 
are inconsistent in their articulated assumptions regarding the 
nature of people and the system of public education. For 
example, Supreme Court rulings prohibit public schools (as 
governmental entities) from endorsing or sponsoring daily Bible 
reading as a devotional service6 and daily or ceremonial 
prayer,7 from inviting ministers of religion on school grounds 
or the first part of the first phrase; "free exercise" refers to the second part. 
3. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
4. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
5. Matthew Hilton, A Preliminary Examination of the Contextual Framework 
of Opinions of the United States Supreme Court (1790·1987) and Its Relevance in 
the Evaluation of the Constitutionality of State Required Moral Education, (1989), 
Appendix 5, (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Brigham Young University). 
6. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
7. See Lee v. Weisman, 112B S.Ct. 2649 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
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for regular voluntary religious instruction,8 from posting the 
Ten Commandments on the classroom wall,9 and from 
requiring teachers to present a non-evolutionary theory of 
creation. 10 On the other hand, the Court has also protected 
the free exercise prerogatives of students and their parents in 
many ways. For example, schools may not require participation 
in specific activities that require participants to violate their 
consciences, religious beliefs, or practices. 11 States are not 
allowed to mandate exclusive attendance at public school12 or 
beyond a certain level where basic educational skills have been 
mastered. 13 Congress may provide that schools which choose 
to allow student clubs to extend to matters of interest outside 
the curriculum must also allow students that desire to meet for 
religious or scripturally based reasons to similarly organize 
during non-instructional time.14 
Notwithstanding these fairly clear results, these and other 
Court opinions have been inconsistent in articulating or 
defining the relationship of the school with the parents or 
guardians of students. Obviously, in a practical sense, neither 
the students, their parents, nor the officials change the 
physical nature of their relationship when they interact with 
each other throughout the day; modem Court opinions viewing 
the legal effects of that relationship are not so consistent. This 
can be demonstrated in at least three different ways. 
First, while school officials can act in the role of a parent 
when preventing obscene or profane speech, 15 the same 
officials lack parental authority when searching for illegal 
contraband16 or allowing school directed religious exercises.17 
Second, an opportunity provided by school officials for 
parents to voluntarily remove their child from religious 
activities held on school grounds is deemed to be 
38 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
8. See Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
9. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), reh'g. denied 449 U.S. 1104 (1981). 
10. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 
U.S. 97 (1968). 
11. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
12. Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925). 
13. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
14. Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
15. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986). 
16. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332 n.2, 341-42 (1985). 
17. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 423-24, 430; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 207-08. 
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unconstitutionally burdensome to the parent and the child. 18 
However, it is of no constitutional significance that other 
parents may be required to pay private school tuition so that 
their children may avoid curriculum perspectives which the 
parents view as hostile to the parent's religious beliefs and 
practices. 19 
Third, those parents that seek judicial prohibition of 
governmental conduct on the grounds that it constitutes 
religious activity are not required to prove that they or their 
children have been individually coerced by the action of school 
officials. On the other hand, those who are seeking to establish 
that the school activity has violated their individually held 
religious beliefs or practices are required to prove that they 
have been coerced by school officials. 20 
Modern Supreme Court opinions reflect additional 
inconsistency in their assumptions regarding the nature of 
students and parochial schools. For example, while "mature" 
students are presumed competent to form and express their 
views regarding nationally divisive military operations,21 to 
voluntarily choose to attend religious clubs after instructional 
time,22 and to independently make the morally and spiritually 
complex decision regarding an induced abortion, 23 the same 
students are assumed to be psychologically "coerced" when an 
invocation or benediction is given at a public school graduation 
ceremony.24 
The Court's analysis of the parochial schools' ability to 
provide benefits of secular learning for their students has been 
similarly inconsistent. In 1968 the Court acknowledged that it 
had "long recognized that religious schools pursue two goals, 
religious instruction and secular education."25 However, three 
years later, after an examination of the "cumulative criteria 
developed by the Court over many years,"26 the Court negated 
18. ld. 
19. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
20. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 n.51 (1985) and cases cited therein; Schempp, 
374 U.S. at 203, 222-23; Engel, 370 U.S. at 421, 430-32. 
21. See Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-07, 511-14 
(1969). 
22. See Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
23. See Casey v. Planned Parenthood of S. Pennsylvania, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 
2806 (1992). 
24. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. at 2649, 2658-61 (1992). 
25. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968). 
26. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
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the effect of legislative findings that such schools did provide 
secular benefits to their students,27 and thereafter either 
assumed that private, religious schools conferred no secular 
benefit on their students,28 avoided the issue when it was 
raised in a federal administrative context,29 or included 
parental decision making to direct the use of federal funds. 30 
The Supreme Court's inconsistent application of these legal 
standards and evidentiary assumptions has not gone unnoticed. 
In the words of one legal scholar, 
[i)t is by now notorious that legal doctrines and judicial 
decisions in the area of religious freedom are in serious 
disarray. In perhaps no other area of constitutional law have 
confusion and inconsistency achieved such undisputed 
sovereignty.31 
State and federal courts have expressed both caution and 
apparent concern over the practical effect of the Court's 
decisions. For example, when the Utah Supreme Court recently 
ruled on the constitutionality of prayer in public meetings, the 
Utah Court refused to incorporate the Supreme Court's Lemon 
test32 into the establishment clause analysis relevant to 
Utah's constitution. Writing for four of five justices, Justice 
Zimmerman observed: 
27. See id. at 613-614. 
28. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 384-87. 
29. N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1979). 
30. See Zobrest v. Catalina Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2462 (1992). 
31. Steven D. Smith, Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional 
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 149-150 (1991). To the degree this conclusion is 
correct, the present state of constitutional law demonstrates that the due process 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment do not become "much more defmite 
when the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard," Barnette, 319 U.S. 
at 624. "Candor compels acknowledgement, moreover, that [the Court] can only 
dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of 
constitutional law," Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
32. The Lemon test, adopted by the United States Supreme Court, imposes 
the following standard for federal establishment clause analysis: 
"Every analysis in this area must begin with the consideration of 
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such 
tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a 
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be 
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . [F ]inally, the statute 
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' 
(Citations omitted.)" 
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602, 612-14. 
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"[T]he United States Supreme Court only devised the Lemon 
test in 1971 and appears to apply it rather opportunistically. 
When the Court wants to reach a result that might not flow 
from a Lemon analysis, it seems quite willing to ignore 
Lemon. Indeed, the Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman 
suggests that Lemon may have been all but abandoned. See 
112 S.Ct. 2649, 2660-61 (1992).33 
Likewise, federal circuit courts of appeals that have recently 
applied the Lemon test to sensitive areas of educational 
curriculum and practices have cautioned against a strict, 
unfeeling application of the Court's precedent. For example, in 
1990, the Tenth Circuit noted that "[i]t is neither wise nor 
necessary to require school officials to sterilize their classrooms 
and libraries of any materials with religious references in order 
to prevent teachers from inculcating specific religious 
values."34 In 1992, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed 
that "radical efforts to avoid pressuring children to be religious 
actually teach and enforce notions that pressure the young to 
avoid all that is religious."35 To presume that the United 
States Supreme Court intended such a result to occur would 
denigrate the Court's own "oft-expressed view that the 
education of this Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility 
of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and 
not of federal judges."36 
With inconsistent application of evidentiary assumptions 
and legal standards, but consistent results that seem to 
disfavor acknowledgment of a religious or theistically based 
world view, it is not surprising that educators have been 
confused regarding the breadth of federal constitutional 
prohibitions on public school curricula and activities. In 1993 
the Utah legislature specifically found that there was a 
"misplaced but widespread fear among public education 
personnel" that teaching and studying about the influence of 
religion was "somehow improper or illegal."37 Education and 
33. Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 227 Utah Adv.Rep. 67, 83-4 n.36 
(December 10, 1992). 
34. Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1055 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied 
112 S.Ct. 3025 (1992). 
35. Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 965-66 (5th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied 113 S.Ct. 2950 (1993). 
36. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
37. House Journal, Fiftieth Legislature, 1993 General Session, at 269 
(hereinafter referred to as House Journal); Senate Journal, Fiftieth Legislature, 
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legal clarification should ''help public school officials to 
appropriately protect and accommodate individual rights in the 
operation of Utah's schools."38 Determining what was 
"appropriate" required (1) elimination of the confusion apparent 
in both constitutional law and the minds of educators and (2) a 
building a widespread consensus that the lines defining lawful 
conduct were both constitutional and desirable.39 
II. CREATING CONSENSUS FOR 
CLARIFYING EDUCATIONAL POLICY 
WITHIN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
Creating consensus regarding the appropriateness of 
educational policy and then establishing the same through non-
judicial law requires satisfying at least two types of consensus: 
legal consensus and political consensus. Legal consensus 
consists of ensuring that as a matter of state and federal 
constitutional law,40 the educational policy or practice that is 
sought to be implemented is an option that is not prohibited. 
Political consensus exists when there is agreement among 
those that are constitutionally empowered to decide that the 
proposed action is indeed the most appropriate. 
Table I below summarizes this multi-level challenge in 
ensuring that there is legal consensus that specific policies or 
practices are not forbidden. Building legal consensus requires 
that each level must act in harmony with the level above 
1993 General Session, at 483 (hereinafter referred to as Senate Journal). 
38. UTAH ADMIN. R., First Reading Rules, R 277-105-2(B) (April 8, 1994) 
(hereinafter referred to as "Draft Rules"). 
39. Of course, whether confusion and intentional adherence to the clearly 
prohibited judicial "results" are eliminated in practice is a function of whether local 
districts, their employees, parents, and students, understand the constitutionally 
valid clarifying standards and choose to follow them. 
40. See Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 
reh'g. denied 475 U.S. 1091 (1986), on remand 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash.), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 850 (1989) reh'g denied sub. nom. 494 U.S. 1050 (1990) for an example of 
a case when state law was applied to make a funding option unconstitutional 
under the state constitution even though it had in fact been found to be 
constitutional under the federal constitution. 
8 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1994 
insofar as it attempts to mandate or prohibit certain 
conduct.41 For example, government sponsored daily prayer in 
the public schools has 
been prohibited by 
the United States 
Supreme Court and in 
Utah by statutory 
provisions. These 
prohibitions should 
indicate to 
administrators and 
teachers that legal 
consensus does not 
allow school-
sponsored prayer in 
classroom teaching or 
student activities.42 
Thus, prior to 
adopting an 
educational policy or 
TABLE 1 
HIERARCHY IN ESTABLISHING 
LEGAL CONSENSUS 
Constitutional Constraints 
(Federal and State Courts) 
Statutory Constraints 
(Legislature) 
Administrative Rules 
(State Offices of Education) 
Local Policies 
(Local Districts) 
Practice 
(Classroom Conduct) 
practice, those who are doing so must be sure that they are 
choosing to act in an area or in a manner upon which there is 
legal consensus that they have the power to actY Once there 
is legal consemms, choosing to act cannot be wrong as a matter 
of law. In a situation where choice is given, educators need not 
41. The search for reasonable certainty in this area often varies depending 
upon the initial perspective taken regarding the freedom to act. I am aware that 
there are educators and counsel who believe that in the church-state area nothing 
can be done unless there is a court opinion requiring educators to act. On the 
other hand, my preference is that all options are open and available unless one 
has been specifically prohibited by a court or constitution of appropriate 
jurisdiction. The choice of one's starting points of analysis has a profound impact 
on determining what is prohibited or allowed with a reasonable degree of certainty. 
42. Apparently, in some places, this awareness is either not widely held or 
not honored. For example, during 1993, I attended one school district in Utah 
where a fifth grade graduation and kindergarten Thanksgiving celebration were 
held. At both events, a public prayer was formally announced and held. Parents 
who expressed concern to me that prayer was held thought the recently enacted 
statute had been violated and did not acknowledge that a Supreme Court opinion 
had not been followed. 
43. For example, a legislature is constrained only by constitutional law. The 
USOE is limited by the constitution and statutory law. A district must follow 
constitutional law, statutory provisions and USOE regulations. An administrator or 
teacher must follow the requirements of constitutional law, statutory law, USOE 
regulations and district policies. 
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act because of legal mandate, but remain free to act m 
accordance with their philosophy or practice. 
A Building Legal Consensus in Utah 
The early drafts of the Utah constitutional freedoms stat-
utes were submitted to and reviewed by the Religious Liberty 
Committee, a special committee created to advise the legisla-
ture on the propriety of amending the religion provisions of the 
Utah Constitution. The committee was comprised of legislative 
leaders, state and local religious leaders, and several lay citi-
zens. Numerous public hearings regarding religious issues were 
held at the State Capitol and throughout the State. During this 
process many presumed that if federal constitutional con-
straints were followed, any constraints under the Utah Consti-
tution would be satisfied.44 The draft regulations presume the 
same.45 
Under federal law, however, careful study and presenta-
tions from various perspectives regarding Supreme Court opin-
44. Testimony from Professor J.D. Williams and myself recommended amend-
ing the Utah constitutional to clarify that speaking about religion or teaching com-
parative religion did not violate the language of Article I, §4 of the Utah Constitu-
tion which prohibited funding for "religious. . . instruction." During the fall of 
1994, voters in the State of Utah may choose to eliminate these concerns by adopt-
ing a proposed constitutional amendment to Article X of the Utah Constitution 
which states as follows: 
The study of the influence of religion, the comparative study of religions, 
or the theistic, agnostic and atheistic assumptions relevant to the educa-
tional curriculum, including cultural heritage, political theory, moral theo-
ry, scientific thought, or societal values, does not constitute either reli-
gious instruction or a sectarian practice forbidden by the Utah Constitu-
tion. 
45. Draft Rule R277-105-3(C) provides as follows: 
Court decisions interpreting Constitutional establishment clause provisions 
are a commonly used source for information about acceptable relationships 
between government and religion. The Board has also attempted to reflect 
applicable rulings in the development of this rule. Because of the relative 
absence of court interpretations concerning the meaning of the Utah Con-
stitution as applied to the public schools, this rule places primary reliance 
upon interpretations of related clauses in the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. In applying the rule, school officials may 
presume that any accommodation of religion which would be permissible 
under applicable rulings interpreting the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, and has not been prohibited in a decision interpreting 
Utah law which is binding upon the Utah public education system, is 
permissible in the schools of the State of Utah. 
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ions revealed two clearly marked guidelines as to when a legis-
lature could seek to reaffirm desirable educational policy. First, 
the results of many United States Supreme Court opinions 
defined certain conduct or policies that are clearly prohibited. 
Second, many times the Court's efforts to narrowly define the 
results of each opinion indicate the areas or means by which 
state and local policy may be established in accordance with 
the constitution. 
For example, while prohibiting govemment sponsored 
prayer in the elementary school classroom, the Court clarified 
that 
nothing in the [Engel] decision is inconsistent with the fact 
that school children and others are officially encouraged to 
express love for our country by reciting historical documents 
such as the Declaration of Independence which contain refer-
ences to the Deity or by singing officially espoused anthems 
which include the composer's professions of faith in a Su-
preme Being, or with the fact that there are many manifesta-
tions in our public life of belief in God. Such patriotic or cere-
monial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unques-
tioned religious exercise [of state sponsored, written daily 
prayer in the classroom]. 46 
Similarly, while the reading of the Bible as a form of daily 
devotional or moral instruction was prohibited, academic study 
that included examination of the Bible was not. 
[l]t might well be said that one's education is not complete 
without a study of comparative religion or the history of reli-
gion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It 
certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its 
literary and historical qualities. Nothing we have said here 
indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when 
presented objectively as a part of a secular program of educa-
tion, may not be effected consistently with the First Amend-
ment.47 
Even when striking down the efforts of Kentucky to post the 
Ten Commandments on the wall of every classroom, the Court 
specifically noted that "[t]his is not a case in which the Ten 
Commandments are integrated into the school curriculum, 
46. Engel, 370 U.S. at 435 n.21. 
47. Schmepp, 374 U.S. at 225. 
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where the ·Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate 
study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the 
like."48 Indeed, "forbidding the posting of the Ten Command-
ments did not mean that no use could ever be made of the Ten 
Commandments, or that the Ten Commandments played an 
exclusively religious role in the history of Western Civiliza-
tion."49 Finally, while a religiously motivated requirement to 
present scientific evidence of a directed rather than evolution-
ary form of creation was prohibited, the Court acknowledged 
that 
[ w ]e do not imply that a legislature could never require that 
scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be 
taught .... [T]eaching a variety of scientific theories about 
the origins of humankind to schoolchildren might be validly 
done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the effective-
ness of science instruction.50 
While it is true that people of different persuasions can see a 
proposal from different perspectives,51 once the constitutional 
parameters are defined with a reasonable degree of certainty, 
then it is time to determine how political consensus can be 
achieved regarding the educational policies and practices that 
are to be followed. 
B. Building Political Consensus for Educational Policy 
Once the clear result oriented constitutional lines were 
drawn to clarify prohibited conduct or policy, extensive work 
was undertaken to determine where consensus could be 
achieved regarding the degree of accommodation or separation 
that was desired for legitimate pedagogical and social reasons. 
Spending extensive time with the interested members of the 
Religious Liberty Committee, legislative leaders and expert 
witnesses clarified the areas where consensus could be built.52 
48. Stone, 449 U.S. at 42-43. 
49. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 594. 
50. !d. at 593-594. 
51. "What would appear to some to be essential to good citizenship might 
well for others border on or constitute instruction in religion." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 
619. Regardless, over time, there appeared to be mutual appreciation for the will-
ingness of many to both give and receive· needed feedback that contributed to the 
building of consensus regarding the legislation and regulations. 
52. Areas where consensus ,was not possible, even at this early stage, in-
cluded whether to define policies by a constitutional amendment rather than by 
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Once in legislative session, there was additional revising with 
representatives of the State Office of Education and Attorney 
General's Office as well as a review of the result with the Reli-
gious Liberty Committee and the appropriate committees of the 
Legislature.53 Finally, even after the Legislature's unanimous 
adoption of the statute and its legislative history, extensive 
work still followed in building consensus among scholars, prac-
titioners and the State Office of Education over the regulations 
that were to implement the statute on a state-wide basis. 
At least four factors contributed to the ability to build 
political consensus among educators, lawyers, legislators, and 
various legal organizations that often represented conflicting 
perspectives on the issues. First, some of the key issues in the 
statute-academic expression and student expression-had 
already had a "trial" run in a local district for almost two 
years. 54 Second, almost a year before the legislation was intro-
duced, then Superintendent Jay B. Taggert formally affirmed 
statute and whether to apply current statutory protections to a university level. 
53. Specific provisions or concepts which were eliminated from or changed in 
the legislation at this stage because of objections of either the State Office of Edu-
cation or counsel representing twenty-two districts in the State of Utah included 
removing the preamble of the bill which reaffirmed by statute various principles 
present in the Utah Constitution, lowering the level of disruption that would be 
tolerated in public schools from "materially interferes" with order or discipline to 
"unreasonably interferes", and striking freedom of conscience provisions that had 
been provided for teachers. The change that limited the level of student disruption 
follows more modern opinions than Tinker. See Note, Planned Parenthood v. Clark 
County School District: "Having Your Cake and Eating It Too" in Public School 
Free Speech Cases, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 893. 
54. As the result of a law suit filed in state court in Washington County 
during 1990--and later moved to federal court by the school district-Washington 
County School District adopted regulations that provided practical experience with 
the academic freedom and student expression portions of the statute. Key provi-
sions of the policy, read as follows: "FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION: The Board 
recognizes the right of free exercise of religion by individuals, including students, 
teachers, and other employees. Therefore, the District shall do nothing that will 
impair the rights or ability of such individuals to the free exercise of their religion 
in activities not sponsored by the District but held on District property. In addi-
tion, during discretionary time on campus, the same persons shall not be restricted 
in their private, personal religious practices, which shall include study of scriptures 
or prayer. FREEDOM OF SPEECH: In accordance with the freedom of religion and 
freedom of speech, the District shall not strike out nor inhibit any portions of 
graduation talks, any classroom discussion, or academic activity solely on the basis 
that religion, Deity, or personal belief is mentioned. No regulation shall be made of 
the content of statements of non-District groups or individuals using school facili-
ties regardless of participation of District employees or students in said non-Dis-
trict sponsored activities solely on the basis that religion, Deity, or personal belief 
is mentioned." These provisions were eventually reviewed by then State Superinten-
dent Jay B. Taggert, as noted in note 55, infra. 
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that the students' right to such expression was in accordance 
with policies of the Utah State Office of Education (USOE) 
then in effect.55 Third, notwithstanding the conflicting opin-
ions by expert witnesses testifying before the Religious Liberty 
Committee regarding various proposals to revise the religion 
clauses in the Utah Constitution, there appeared to be near 
unanimity among experts that, in fact, in the area of public 
education, there was substantial confusion in the minds of 
educators and the public regarding what was constitutionally 
permissible conduct in the public schools. Fourth, the Utah 
legislature invoked a rarely used procedure, adopting very 
specific statements of legislative intent in each House immedi-
ately after the adoption of the statute.56 This specific state-
ment of legislative intent was the foundation for the formu-
lation of administrative rules. This was needed because it was 
not clear what role the USOE desired to have in the process. 57 
All four circumstances contributed to the ability to build unani-
mous political consensus in favor of the legislation. 58 
55. As it related to students, "we see no conflict between your policy and 
applicable State Board of Education policies or rules so far as the students, the 
general public, and employees acting in their private capacities are concerned." As 
it related to employee expression of personal belief, "[s]chool agents and employees 
should be extremely cautious when acting in their official capacities about express-
ing their personal religious beliefs or the rightfulness or wrongfulness of any other 
person's religious beliefs or lack thereof." Letter from Jay B. Taggert, Utah State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction to Steven M. Peterson, Washington County 
School District Superintendent, April 19, 1991. This opinion letter has legal signifi-
cance because by statute such opinions are "considered to be correct and final un-
less set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction or by subsequent legislation." 
UTAH CODE ANN. §53A-1-303(4) (1993). 
56. See House Journal and Senate Journal, supra note 37. 
57. Three years earlier the State School Board had twice refused to consider 
a formal request to promulgate rules regarding the issues addressed by the stat-
utes. In addition, because the overworked legal staff of USOE had been assigned to 
other matters that had been deemed to have a higher priority, the USOE chose 
not to be involved on an on-going basis with the Religious Liberty Committee in 
the formulation of the statutes. 
58. Whether one views Divine assistance on behalf of freedom as being a key 
fifth factor depends on one's perspective and personal experience. Recognizing Di-
vine intervention is not unknown in the American experience. Many declarations of 
personal faith are included in the Declaration of Independence, state constitutions, 
official declarations, and personal accounts of early founders of this nation and the 
state of Utah. Based on my intimate experience over a four year period with the 
issues involved in this legislation (including unsuccessful efforts to encourage USOE 
to adopt regulations addressing these issues; the litigation related to and formula-
tion of the Washington County School District policy and its subsequent partial ap-
proval by the State Superintendent; drafting, suggesting and revising the legisla-
tion and the legislative intent statement for the Religious Liberty Committee and 
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Ill. AREAS OF CONSENSUS IN UTAH: 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM, FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 
AND STUDENT EXPRESSION 
A. Clarifying Constitutional Constraints 
on Academic Freedom 
[1994 
The Utah statute clarifies that those designing and teach-
ing curricula or activities may include the study of religion or 
other matters containing theistic, agnostic and atheistic as-
sumptions provided it is done in a secular manner and in accor-
dance with other state and local policies. Unlike the require-
ments in Aguillard, (the Supreme Court creationist science 
case from Louisiana), the options to include or exclude such 
matters are left to the academic discretion of the teacher in-
volved and local policy requirements not in conflict with the 
statute. 
Utah Legislature; subsequent work on state-wide regulations; and primary drafting 
of the proposed constitutional amendment), I am of the opinion that there was 
Divine assistance in the adoption of this legislation and its implementing regula-
tions. I believe this is evident in at least two ways. 
First, there was an unprecedented unanimity regarding the final product. Like 
the conflicting opinions that led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights to the United 
States Constitution, I believe that the many conflicting viewpoints that contributed 
to the legislation and implementing regulations made them much better than had 
they been drafted from only one perspective or by only one person. The blending of 
compromises into one text and legislative history may well have contributed to the 
final unanimity. However, for me, the creation of unanticipated unanimity from 
such diverse backgrounds and views is evidence of Divine intervention. Political 
consensus has been recognized as evidence of such an occurrence in our past. 
Speaking of the United States Constitution, James Madison recognized that over-
coming many conflicting viewpoints (including his own) "with a unanimity almost 
as unprecedented as it must have been unexpected" was evidence of Divine inter-
vention. See James Madison, Federalist Papers, Number 37. Like Madison, some of 
my initial views and ideas were properly changed and compromised in the consen-
sus building process. 
Second, I am aware of the prayers and heartfelt yearnings of many from differ-
ent beliefs and persuasions regarding the development and adoption of the statute 
and regulations. For me, this awareness has reaffirmed that "the power of prayer 
[is] deep in the religious convictions of many" United States v. Ballard, 332 U.S. 
78, 87 (1944). Thus, in response to an observation that many "outside" of the legis-
lative process felt I "didn't have a prayer" in having the legislation adopted, I have 
publicly acknowledged while teaching a graduate seminar that I believe that the 
statute was adopted precisely because of the significant effort, sacrifice, and 
prayers of many people. 
So long as many people maintain deeply held convictions about the power of 
prayer and the need to protect the freedom to make moral choices within the 
framework of constitutional law, I believe there will continue to be Divine assis-
tance in favor of freedom. 
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The state's draft regulation R 277-105-4 tracks the statute 
and clearly outline the guidelines of constitutionally appropri-
ate curricula and teacher conduct in the classroom: 
(A) A study, performance or display which includes examina-
tion of or presentations about religion, religious thought or 
expression, or influence thereof in music, art, literature, law, 
politics, history, or any other portion of the curriculum may 
be undertaken in the public schools so long as it is designed 
to achieve permissible educational objectives and is presented 
within the context of the approved curriculum. 
(B) The objective study of comparative religions is permissible 
but no religious tenet, belief, or denomination may be given 
inappropriate preferences. 
(C) No aspect of cultural heritage, political or moral theory, or 
societal value may be either included or excluded from consid-
eration in the public schools primarily because it explicitly or 
implicitly contains theistic, agnostic, or atheistic assumptions. 
(D) An analysis of religion, deity, an absolute moral principle, 
or any other concept that may contain a theistic, agnostic or 
non-theistic assumption, may be presented when included as 
an appropriate component or aspect of a broader study, dis-
play, presentation, or discussion regarding cultural heritage, 
political theory, moral theory or a societal value.59 
However, the academic study of these assumptions and con-
cepts is not to be presumed to be a license for school employees 
to proselytize students at school. Draft Rule R277-105-8 pro-
vides the following: 
(A) An employee's rights relating to voluntary religious prac-
tices and freedom of speech do not include proselytizing of 
any student regarding atheistic, agnostic, sectarian, religious, 
or denominational doctrine while the employee is acting in 
the employee's official capacity, nor may an employee attempt 
to use his position to influence a student regarding the 
student's religious beliefs or lack thereof. 
However, spontaneous student initiated inquiry regarding be-
lief is not prohibited. 
(B) Even though acting in an official capacity, an employee 
may respond in appropriate and restrained manner to a spon-
taneous question from a student regarding the employee's 
59. Draft Rules R277-105-4. 
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personal belief or perspective. Nevertheless, because of the 
special position of trust held by school employees, all such 
employees should exercise great caution in expressing person-
al religious beliefs or perspectives, or opinions about the 
rightfulness or wrongfulness of any other person's religious 
beliefs or lack thereof. 60 
Draft Rule R277-105-7 addressed government sponsored prayer 
and prior practices allowing many school choirs to sing in a 
variety of religious services. 
A. Public school officers and employees may neither authorize 
nor encourage prayer or devotional activities in connection 
with any class, program, presentation or other activity which 
is under the control, direction, or sponsorship of a public 
school or school district. This subsection shall not act to re-
strict rights under R277-105-6. 61 
B. No school employee or student may be required to attend 
or participate in any religious worship service, whether in an 
individual capacity or as a member of a performing group, 
regardless of where or when the service is held. No penalty 
may be assessed for failure to attend or perform in such an 
activity. 
C. Subject to the requirements of Subsection R277-105-5,62 
students who are members of performing groups such as 
school choirs may be required to rehearse or otherwise per-
form in a church-owned or operated facility if the following 
conditions are met: 
(1) the performance is not part of a religious service; 
(2) the activity of which the performance is a part is 
neither intended to further a religious objective nor 
under the direction of a church official; and 
(3) the activity is open to the general public. 
D. Students may voluntarily attend and perform during a 
religious service as individuals or as members of a group, 
provided all arrangements are initiated and carried out by 
students or non-school personnel. 
E. Religious activities may be conducted on the same basis as 
any other non-school activity outside of regular school hours. 
60. Draft Rules, R277-105-8. 
61. This regulation deals with religious and non-religious student expression 
and conduct in and outside the classroom and statutory protections afforded the 
same. 
62. This regulation deals with the implementation of the freedom of con-
science provisions and the statutory protections afforded the same. 
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F. Subject to the requirements of R277-105-5, students may 
be required to visit church-owned facilities when religious 
services are not being conducted if the visit is intended solely 
for the purpose of pursuing permissible educational objectives 
such as those relating to art, music, architecture, or history. 
17 
Observations made outside of the State of Utah63 have con-
cluded that these decisions of the legislature and USOE are 
justifiable on pedagogical and administrative grounds. 
[T]he providing of clarifying guidelines [in the areas of aca-
demic freedom] through board policy in this sensitive area is 
justified on pedagogical and administrative grounds because 
it will serve to (1) encourage greater breadth in the selection 
of curriculum, (2) create greater confidence in our teachers of 
the appropriateness of their selection, (3) eliminate confusion 
which invites litigation, and (4) facilitate professional training 
of employees. 64 
Neither the Utah legislature nor USOE required its teachers to 
present certain matters; rather, they allowed for the same if 
the teachers, in their professional discretion and in accordance 
with other state and local curriculum requirements, chose to do 
so. 
B. Protecting Freedom of Conscience 
Parents and students' rights to exercise freedom of con-
science or religion may not to be infringed by requiring partici-
pation in a particular school curriculum or a school activity. 
Under the Utah law, the right to freedom of conscience could 
be asserted by a secondary student with notification to the 
student's parent or guardian,65 an elementary student with 
the approval of the parent or guardian,66 or a custodial parent 
or legal guardian of a student. "This section protects individual 
rights of conscience by granting them priority over administra-
63. During 1993, the Melissa Independent School District, in Texas, 
(hereinafter referred to as "MISD") adopted local policies patterned after the Utah 
statute and early drafts of the USOE regulations. I served as an educational con-
sultant to the MISD as they did this. The MISD version harmonized their action 
with their strategic plan and articulated pedagogical and administrative rationales 
that the local board felt justified the actions taken. 
64. MISD Policies, DH (LOCAL) and EMI (LOCAL), PART I, at 2 (citations 
omitted). 
65. UTAH CODE ANN. §§53A-13-101.2, 101.2(3)(c), 101.3 (1993). 
66. Draft Rules, R277-105-3 D (3). 
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tive convenience.'.s7 The Utah legislature specifically intended 
to abrogate Smith's68 limiting effect on parents' and students' 
free exercise of religion and conscience. 69 
To assert a right of conscience or infringement on religious 
belief or practice, 70 the student or parent would have to claim 
that required participation in a portion of the curriculum or 
activity would submit the student to at least one of the follow-
ing three occurrences: 
(1) participation in such an event would require an affirmance 
or denial of a religious belief or right of conscience; 
(2) participation in a practice forbidden by a religious belief or 
practice, or right of conscience; or 
(3) non-participation in a practice required by religious belief 
or practice, or right of conscience.71 
67. House Journal at 270; Senate Journal at 484. 
68. This decision served to allow government to limit the free exercise of 
religion by using a generally applicable law which was not focused at a particular 
religion. See Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990) reh'g denied 496 U.S. 913. 
69. House Journal at 271; Senate Journal at 485. Since the enactment of the 
legislation, the United States Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, known a "RFRA," codified as 42 U.S.C. 2000 (b)(b). This would require courts 
to allow governmental action which "substantially burdens" the exercise of religious 
freedoms to be limited by "the least restrictive" means requirement; thus, since the 
statue's reliance on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) reaffirms the applica-
tion of the standard in matters of public education, it appears that the "least re-
strictive" portion of the Utah statute is now required by federal law. However, 
since the legislature's adoption of the statute and the USOE's regulations all pre-
supposed the statute and rules reflected application of the standard of UTAH 
CONST., art. III, §1, ("Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed,") it 
would seem that if the "substantially burdened" requirement of RFRA is interpret-
ed to mean anything other than an a requirement of direct interference, then the 
Utah statute could well impose a higher standard of protection than would be 
required to initially satisfy the requirements of RFRA. 
70. A careful distinction was made in the statutory language between freedom 
or right of conscience and exercise of religious belief, religious right. This was 
intended to include protection for those who believe that their conscience has a 
source that is independent of religion or Deity. The same protection was included 
in the Draft Rules. The Draft Rules provide that the "[e]xercise of religious free-
dom means the right to choose or reject religious, theistic, agnostic or atheistic 
convictions and to act upon that choice." R277-105-1 E. 
71. The legislature specifically relied on the well recognized case of Motzert v. 
Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1067 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.denied 484 
U.S. 1066 (1988), which was cited in the Intent Statement. See House Journal at 
270; Senate Journal at 484. Like Motzert, the legislation requires that students or 
their parents demonstrate that the curriculum or activity required them to "affirm 
or deny a belief or engage or refrain from engaging in a practice prohibited or re-
quired by their religion." !d. at 1070. However, the legislation and USOE regula-
tions specifically reject the assumption that the granting of opt-out provisions on 
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The Legislature intended that mere offense to personal prefer-
ence would not constitute infringement of conscience.72 Fol-
lowing the lead of United States v. Seeger,73 the legislature in-
tended that the conduct must violate a duty "superior to those 
arising from any human relation."74 The implementing regula-
tion succinctly states that the infringement "must rise to a 
level of belief that the requested conduct violates a superior 
duty which is more than personal preference."75 School per-
sonnel are not required or allowed to define the nature of a 
parent's or student's freedom of conscience or religious be-
lief. 76 
An objecting party is given the right to either request a 
waiver of participation in entirety or request "a reasonable 
altemative that requires reasonably equivalent performance by 
the student of the secular objectives of the curriculum or activi-
ty in question.'177 No student can be required to participate in 
an objectionable activity unless the school official finds that 
"requiring participation of that particular student is the least 
restrictive means necessary to achieve a specifically identified 
educational objective in furtherance of a compelling govemmen-
tal interest.''78 It appears unlikely that this regulatory stan-
dard could ever be satisfied. 
grounds of religion or conscience "would result in a public school system impossible 
to administer." ld. at 1072 (Kennedy, J., concurring.) C{. id. at 1080 n. 9 (Boggs, 
J., concurring) ("I do not think that there is any evidence that actually accommo-
dating pupils in practice need be as difficult as the state contends. Indeed, the 
state espouses a theory of rigidity (and finds alleged experts to support it) that 
seems a bit ludicrous in this age of individualized attention to many kinds of stu-
dents languages and interest. There was no evidence of actual confusion or disrup-
tion from the accommodation that did take place.") In addition, while Justice Boggs 
concurred in the opinion in Motzert because of his feeling that judicially mandating 
the accommodation was "a challenge to the politically-controlled school system,~ id. 
at 1079 (Boggs, J., concurring), such a fear need not be relevant in this situation 
because the decision to accommodate freedom of conscience was a legislative rather 
than judicial decision. 
72. The Utah legislature intended that "the claim that a violation of this 
'superior duty' would arise from comprehensive, internalized values rather than a 
hastily drawn conclusion that any portion of the public school curriculum or school 
activity was 'distasteful or immoral or absurd or all of these.' Lee v. Weisman, 112 
S.Ct. 2649, 2657 (1992)." House Journal at 484-85; Senate Journal at 270. 
73. 380 U.S. 163, 175 (1965). 
74. House Journal at 270; Senate Journal at 484. 
75. Draft Rules, R277-105-5 B. 
76. House Journal at 270; Senate Journal at 484. 
77. UTAH CODE ANN. §53A-13-102 (l)(b) (1993). 
78. Draft Rules, R 277-105-5 F; Draft Rules R277-105-9-2(d). 
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As was done in Melissa, Texas, local districts in Utah could 
articulate compelling reasons to justify allowing these 
protections for freedom of conscience. Recognizing freedom of 
conscience as an inalienable right justifies extending the 
protections. 
[T]he right of freedom of conscience and exercise of the reli-
gious freedoms of belief and thought are unalienable and 
fundamental because (1) the dictates of conscience or each 
person's belief 'depend[s] only on the evidence contemplated 
by their own minds' and conscience, and (2) reflects the duties 
owed to the 'Governor of the Universe,' which duties are 'pre-
cedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the 
claims of Civil Society.'79 
If one accepts these political assumptions as being valid and 
legally significant, there are several pedagogical and adminis-
trative grounds to justify protecting freedom of conscience and 
exercise of religious freedoms. Possible benefits of such a policy 
could include the following: 
(1) encourage students and their families to internalize values 
of their own choosing, (2) encourage greater confidence in our 
parents of the ultimate appropriateness of the school curricu-
la and activities that are provided for their children, (3) elimi-
nate confusion which invites litigation, and (4) facilitate pro-
fessional interaction with and support of the parents in our 
community[.]80 
Encouraging these positive outcomes may well justify the ex-
press intent of the Utah legislature and mandate of the USOE 
that local districts are to ensure 
that any portion of any curriculum or activity that is repeat-
edly alleged to interfere with the rights of conscience or exer-
cise of religious freedom of students, parents or legal guard-
ians shall be evaluated to determine whether the educational 
objectives could be achieved by a less intrusive means. 81 
79. MISD Policies, EMI (LOCAL), Part II, pg. 1, citing Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947), (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting James Madi-
son, "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments"). 
80. MISD Policies, EMI (LOCAL), Part II, pgs. 2-3 (citations omitted). 
81. Draft Rules R277-105-9 A(2)(e); see also House Journal at 270-71; Senate 
Journal at 485. 
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Protecting freedom of conscience and the exercise of reli-
gious freedom is expressly recognized by the Utah 
Constitution's provision that allowing for "[p]erfect toleration of 
religious sentiment"82 and protection of conscience.83 Since 
Barnette, for fifty years the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized the right of public school students to protection 
under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment from 
compelled affirmations contrary to their conscience. 84 Thus, 
articulating state and local educational policies to protect free-
dom of conscience and the exercise of religious freedoms not 
only can contribute to significant pedagogical and administra-
tive objectives, but also can support and clarify various texts of 
the Utah Constitution. 
C. Defining Parameters of Student Expression 
The last section of the Utah statute85 focused on protect-
ing student expression of personal values and belief. The intent 
of the Utah legislature was to allow 
all students regardless of age, to formulate and express their 
personal views, values, and opinions subject only to the condi-
tions specified. Thus, a limited public forum for students, 
similar to that upheld in Bell v. Little Axe Independent School 
District No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1401-1402 (lOth Cir. 1985), 
has been created. This paragraph protects important facets of 
that perfect toleration of religious sentiment and freedom of 
conscience (whether expressed as speech or practice) guaran-
teed under the Utah constitution (Article I, §4; Art.3, §1), 
with certain narrowly drawn exceptions.86 
Again, MISD observed that providing this kind of protection 
furthered important educational and administrative interests. 
82. UTAH CONST., art. III, §1. 
83. UTAH CONST., art. I, §4. As for MISD, the Texas Constitution provides 
that "[n]o human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere 
with the rights of conscience in matters of religion". TEXAS CONST., art. I, §6. See 
also Church v. Bullock, 109 S.W. 115 (1908). 
84. Even without RFRA, it is important to remember that the Smith opinion 
still upheld the validity of Barnette. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
85. UTAH CODE ANN. §53A-13-101.3 (1993). 
86. House Journal at 271; Senate Journal at 485. It is important to note that 
the "limited public forum" for student expression created by the statute is not the 
same as the "limited open forum" under the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §407l(b) 
(1992). The right of all students under the "limited forum doctrines" encouraged by 
the legislature does not create the forum allowed by the Equal Access Act. 
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Encouraging students to freely express their values and per-
sonal beliefs in and outside of the classroom will contribute to 
their development of basic communication skills, encourage a 
positive self-image, and foster development of long-term citi-
zenship and ethical behavior. Such practices will further 
encourage the student to personally internalize the thinking 
skills and citizenship skills presented in the curriculum .... 
[B]y creating a limited public forum for student expression, 
students will begin to learn the skills of civil, considered dis-
course that is the hal1mark of a free people.87 
Time for student expression was appropriately divided into that 
which would be allowed during instructional time (in the class-
room) and that allowed during "discretionary time" (outside of 
the classroom). Discretionary time included, among other 
things, free time before and after school, time during recess, 
lunch, between classes, in the hallways, private time before 
athletic and other events or activities, and time spent on buses. 
However, allowing this limited public forum was condi-
tioned on student compliance with certain standards. Following 
the lead of the Equal Access Act and the power of the local 
district to regulate "vulgar, lewd," and "plainly offensive" 
speech,88 any form of expression or conduct which "unreason-
ably interferes with order or discipline, threatens the well-be-
ing of persons or property, or violates concepts of civility or 
propriety appropriate to a school setting."89 is inappropriate 
for the classroom. 
Expression outside of the classroom was subject to a slight-
ly less restrictive standard. Prohibited conduct was narrowed to 
unreasonable interference with "the ability of school officials to 
maintain order and discipline," (rather than interference with 
order and discipline), or actual "endangering" (as opposed to 
threatening) the well-being of person or property. Standards of 
civility and decorum continued to be required.90 
87. MISD Policies, FMA (LOCAL), p. 1. 
88. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 n.4 (1988) (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 
682·84 (1986)). 
89. UTAH CODE ANN. §53A-13-101.3(1) (1993). 
90. UTAH CODE ANN. §53A-13-101.3(2)(b) (1993). As an addition to what Utah 
has proposed, the local policies adopted by MISD defined student expression and 
clarified, among other things, that "[l]iterature or printed materials that a student 
may choose to distribute need not be written or created by the student." MISD 
Policies, Amending Policy FMA (LOCAL), at 2. 
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The limitations imposed on student expression were in-
tended to be "narrowly drawn exceptions,"91 representative of 
"compelling governmental interests."92 Nonetheless, even 
when justified by these limitations on student expression, the 
limitations were to be applied by the "least restrictive means" 
necessary to further the government interest in order, disci-
pline and safety. 93 In practice, this means that when student 
expression causes disorder, threatens well-being, concepts of 
civility or decorum that should exist in public schools, the re-
striction on student expression must interfere the least amount 
necessary to achieve the protections for people and property 
outlined in the statute. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Careful consideration of pedagogical and administrative 
needs of students, teachers, administrators and parents can 
justify the formulation of statutes, regulations and policies that 
recognize the existence of constitutionally permissible options 
for teaching about religion and the theistic, agnostic and athe-
istic assumptions contained in our cultural heritage, political 
theory, moral theory and societal values. Current Supreme 
Court opinions presently exempt this type of integrated curric-
ulum from attacks under the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment. 
Creating a limited public forum to encourage student ex-
pression and internalization of values is not required by cur-
rent Supreme Court opinions. However, it is an option for those 
educational or legislative entities that choose to do so as an 
effort to encourage student expression as a means of developing 
basic communication skills and a positive self-image, fostering 
long-term development of duties of citizenship, moral and ethi-
cal behavior, and maintaining civil, considered public discourse. 
A conscious decision to do so would necessarily presume that 
such could occur without compromising the educational mis-
sion, discipline and decorum of the public school. 
It would seem that the requirements to provide protection 
of free exercise of religion has long been part of state and feder-
al constitutional texts and case law. However, adoption by 
91. House Journal at 271; Senate Journal at 485. 
92. Id. 
93. ld.; §53A-13-101.3(3) UTAH CODE ANN. 
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educational and legislative entities of express statutes, regula-
tions and policies protecting freedom of conscience and the 
exercise of religious freedoms from intrusion by government 
can serve two important purposes. First, any existing confusion 
regarding the exercise of religious freedom available under 
federal law in the public schools would be eliminated by a vol-
untary restoration of the earlier, higher standard of "compel-
ling governmental interest-least restrictive means" analysis. 
Second, openly protecting freedom of conscience and exercise of 
religious freedoms encourages students and their families to 
internalize values of their own choosing, provides parents with 
greater confidence in the ultimate appropriateness of the school 
curricula and activities for their child, eliminates possible con-
fusion as to what policies are, and facilitates professional inter-
action between school employees and parents in the communi-
ty. Nothing in current state or federal Supreme Court opinions 
prohibit this type of educational policy-making to be articulated 
and implemented through appropriate secular means and ends 
identified in state and local statutes, regulations and policies. 
Neither legal nor educational constraints require a continu-
ation of constitutional confusion, professional misjudgment, and 
public misunderstanding of lawful protections of and con-
straints on academic freedom, student expression, freedom of 
conscience, or the exercise of religious freedoms. Careful articu-
lation, drafting, and commitment to the underlying constitu-
tional limitations and secular objectives that would be served 
by such clarification can be done by state and local legislative 
and educational entities. To not do so is to abandon an opportu-
nity to be actively involved in the directing and defining of 
educational policies expressed by law. Failure to exercise that 
state, local and personal sovereignty could well limit the nature 
and extent of future freedoms available to all. 
1] RECOGNIZING CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS 25 
APPENDIX A 
53A-13-101. Instruction in health - Parental consent 
requirements - Character habits - Political and reli-
gious doctrine prohibited. 
(1) The State Board of Education shall establish curriculum 
requirements under Section 53A-1-402, that include instruction 
1n: 
(a) community and personal health; (b) physiology; (c) personal 
hygiene; and (d) prevention of communicable disease, including 
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. That instruction shall 
stress the importance of abstinence from all sexual activity 
before marriage and fidelity after marriage as methods of pre-
vention of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. 
(2) Instruction in the courses described in Subsection (1) shall 
be consistent and systematic in grades eight through 12. At the 
request of the board, the Department of Health shall cooperate 
with the board in developing programs to provide instruction in 
those areas. 
(3) The board shall adopt rules that provide that the parental 
consent requirements of Sections 76-7-322 and 76-7-323 are 
complied with, and rules that require a student's parent or 
legal guardian to be notified in advance and have an opportuni-
ty to review the information for which parental consent is re-
quired under Sections 76-7-322 and 76-7-323. The board shall 
also provide procedures for disciplinary action for violation of 
Section 76-7-322 or 76-7-323. 
(4) Honesty, temperance, morality, courtesy, obedience to law, 
respect for and an understanding of the Constitutions of the 
United States and the state of Utah, the essentials and benefits 
of the free enterprise system, respect for parents and home, 
and the dignity and necessity of honest labor and other skills, 
habits, and qualities of character which will promote an up-
right and desirable citizenry and better prepare students for a 
richer, happier life shall be taught in connection with regular 
school work. 
53A-13-101.1. Maintaining constitutional freedom in the 
public schools. 
(1) Any instructional activity, performance, or display which 
includes examination of or presentations about religion, politi-
cal or religious thought or expression, or the influence thereof 
on music, art, literature, law, politics, history, or any other 
element of the curriculum, including the comparative study of 
?&Qf 
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religions, which is designed to achieve secular educational 
objectives included within the context of a course or activity 
and conducted in accordance with applicable rules of the state 
and local boards of education, may be undertaken in the public 
schools. 
(2) No aspect of cultural heritage, political theory, moral theo-
ry, or societal value shall be included within or excluded from 
public school curricula for the primary reason that it affirms, 
ignores, or denies religious belief, religious doctrine, a religious 
sect, or the existence of a spiritual realm or supreme being. 
(3) Public schools may not sponsor prayer or religious 
devotionals. 
( 4) School officials and employees may not use their positions 
to endorse, promote, or disparage a particular religious, denom-
inational, sectarian, agnostic, or atheistic belief or viewpoint. 
53A-13-101.2. Waivers of participation. 
(1) If a parent with legal custody or other legal guardian of a 
student, or a secondary student, determines that the student's 
participation in a portion of the curriculum or in an activity 
would require the student to affirm or deny a religious belief or 
right of conscience, or engage or refrain from engaging in a 
practice forbidden or required in the exercise of a religious 
right or right of conscience, the parent, guardian, or student 
may request: 
(a) a waiver of the requirement to participate; or (b) a reason-
able alternative that requires reasonably equivalent perfor-
mance by the student of the secular objectives of the curricu-
lum or activity in question. 
(2) The school shall promptly notify a student's parent or 
guardian if the student makes a request under Subsection (1). 
(3) If a request is made under this section, the school shall: 
(a) waive the participation requirement; (b) provide a reason-
able alternative to the requirement; or (c) notify the requesting 
party that participation is required. The school shall ensure 
that the provisions of Subsection 53A-13-101.3(3) are met in 
connection with any required participation. 
53A-13-101.3. Expressions of belief- Discretionary time. 
(1) Expression of personal beliefs by a student participating in 
school-directed curricula or activities may not be prohibited or 
penalized unless the expression unreasonably interferes with 
order or discipline, threatens the well-being of persons or prop-
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erty, or violates concepts of civility or propriety appropriate to 
a school setting. 
(2) (a) As used in this section, discretionary time means 
noninstructional time during which a student is free to pursue 
personal interests. (b) Free exercise of voluntary religious prac-
tice or freedom of speech by students during discretionary time 
shall not be denied unless the conduct unreasonably interferes 
with the ability of school officials to maintain order and disci-
pline, unreasonably endangers persons or property, or violates 
concepts of civility or propriety appropriate to a school setting. 
(3) Any limitation under Sections 53A-13-101.2 and 53A-13-
101.3 on student expression, practice, or conduct shall be by 
the least restrictive means necessary to satisfy the school's 
interests as stated in those sections, or to satisfy another spe-
cifically identified compelling governmental interest. 
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APPENDIXB 
R277. Education, Administration. 
R277-105. Recognizing Constitutional Freedoms in the 
Schools. 
R277-105-1. Definitions. 
A. "Board" means the Utah State Board of Education. 
B. "Conscience" means a standard based upon learned 
experiences, a personal philosophy or system of belief, religious 
teachings or doctrine, an absolute or external sense of right 
and wrong which is felt on an individual basis, a belief in an 
external Absolute, or any combination of the foregoing. 
C. "Discretionary time" for students means school-related 
time that is not instructional time. It includes free time before 
and after school, during lunch and between classes or on buses, 
and private time before athletic and other events or activities. 
D. "District" or "school district" means a public school 
district, the Utah Schools for the Deaf and the Blind, or an 
Applied Technology Center. 
E. ''Exercise of religious freedom" means the right to 
choose or reject religious, theistic, agnostic, or atheistic convic-
tions and to act upon that choice. 
F. "Guardian" means a person who has been granted legal 
guardianship of a child in accordance with state law. 
G. "Instructional time" means time during which a school 
is responsible for a student and the student is required or ex-
pected to be actively engaged in a learning activity. It includes 
instructional activities in the classroom or study hall during 
regularly scheduled hours, required activities outside the class-
room, and counseling, private conferences, or tutoring provided 
by school employees or volunteers acting in their official capaci-
ties during or outside of regular school hours. 
H. "Parent" means a biological or adoptive parent who has 
legal custody of a child. 
I. "USOE" means the Utah State Office of Education. 
R277-105-2. Authorization and Purpose. 
A. This rule is adopted pursuant to Utah Constitution 
Article X, Section 3 which vests general control and supervision 
of public education in the Board. It is based upon the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; Article I, 
Section 4, Article III, Sections 1 and 4, and Article X, Section 1 
of the Utah State Constitution which speak of rights of con-
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science, perfect toleration of religious sentiment, the free exer-
cise of religion, and prohibitions against the establishment of 
religion or the imposition of secular control in the schools; 
Section 53A-13-101(4), which directs that curriculum promoting 
respect for parents and home, morality, qualities of character 
and respect for and an understanding of the Constitutions of 
the United States and the State of Utah be taught in connec-
tion with regular school work; and Sections 53A-13-101.1 
through 53A-13-101.3, which provide direction for the USOE 
and school districts regarding curriculum, freedom of con-
science, exercise of religious freedoms, and student expression. 
B. The purpose of this rule is to help public school officials 
to protect and accommodate individual rights in the operation 
of Utah's schools. 
R277-105-3. Interpretive Context for the Rule. 
A. The Board recognizes the importance of religious belief 
and practice and other expressions of conscience in the lives of 
many people, the critical role that such beliefs have played in 
the development of societies and cultures throughout the world, 
and the influence that these beliefs continue to have on con-
cepts and interpretations relating to school curricula. The 
Board also recognizes that Utah is becoming a pluralistic soci-
ety with an increasing diversity of peoples and beliefs, and that 
this diversity will require the development of greater tolerance 
and understanding among the people of the state. 
B. The Constitution of Utah prohibits the use of the powers 
of government to encourage or discourage religious beliefs or 
practices, or to repress rights of conscience. Given their unique 
relationship to children attending the public schools, school 
officials must be particularly careful to remain neutral in mat-
ters relating to religion, while striving to accommodate the 
religious beliefs and practices and the freedom of conscience of 
students and their parents. 
C. Court decisions interpreting Constitutional establish-
ment clause provisions are a commonly used source for infor-
mation about acceptable relationships between government and 
religion. The Board has attempted to reflect applicable rulings 
in the development of this rule. Because of the relative absence 
of court interpretations concerning the meaning of the Utah 
Constitution as applied to the public schools, this rule places 
primary reliance upon interpretations of related clauses in the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In apply-
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ing the rule, school officials may presume that any accommoda-
tion of religion which would be permissible under applicable 
rulings interpreting the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and has not been prohibited in a decision inter-
preting Utah law which is binding upon the Utah public educa-
tion system, is permissible in the schools of the State of Utah. 
R277-105-4 Creation and Implementation of Curriculum 
A. A study, performance, or display which includes exami-
nation of or presentations about religion, religious thought or 
expression, or the influence thereof in music, art, literature, 
law, politics, history, or any other portion of the curriculum 
may be undertaken in the public schools so long as it is de-
signed to achieve permissible educational objectives and is 
presented within the context of the approved curriculum. 
B. The objective study of comparative religions is permissi-
ble, but no religious tenet, belief, or denomination may be given 
inappropriate emphasis. 
C. No aspect of cultural heritage, political or moral theory, 
or societal value may be either included or excluded from con-
sideration in the public schools primarily because it explicitly 
or implicitly contains theistic, agnostic, or atheistic assump-
tions. 
D. An analysis of religion, deity, an absolute moral princi-
ple, or any other concept that may contain a theistic, agnostic, 
or non-theistic assumption, may be presented when included as 
an appropriate component or aspect of a broader study, display, 
presentation, or discussion regarding cultural heritage, political 
theory, moral theory or a societal value 
R277-105-5 Requests for Waiver of Participation in 
School Activities 
A. A parent, a legal guardian of a student, or a secondary 
student may request a waiver of participation in any portion of 
the curriculum or school activity which the requesting party 
believes to be an infringement upon a right of conscience or the 
exercise of religious freedom in any of the following ways: 
(1). it would require an affirmance or denial of a religious 
belief or right of conscience; 
(2). it would require participation in a practice forbidden by 
a religious belief or practice, or right of conscience; or 
(3). it would bar participation in a practice required by a 
religious belief or practice, or right of conscience. 
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B. A claimed infringement under Subsection A must rise to 
a level of belief that the requested conduct violates a superior 
duty which is more than personal preference. 
C. If a minor student seeks a waiver of participation under 
Subsection A, the school shall promptly notify the student's 
parent or legal guardian about the student's choice. In the 
event of a conflict, a parent's or legal guardian's wishes shall 
prevail over those of a minor student. 
D. A parent, guardian, or secondary student requesting a 
waiver of participation under Subsection A may also suggest an 
alternative that requires reasonably equivalent performance by 
the student of the objective of the curriculum or activity that is 
believed to be objectionable. 
E. In responding to a request under Subsection A, the 
school shall: 
( 1) waive participation by the student in the objectionable 
curriculum or activity; 
(2) provide a reasonable alternative as suggested by the 
parent or secondary student, or other reasonable alternative 
developed in consultation with the requesting party, that will 
achieve the objectives of the portion of the curriculum or activi-
ty for which waiver is sought; or 
(3) deny the request. 
F. A request for waiver of required participation shall not 
be denied unless the responsible school official finds that re-
quiring the participation of that particular student is the least 
restrictive means necessary to achieve a specifically identified 
educational objective in furtherance of a compelling governmen-
tal interest. 
G. In responding to a request under Subsection A, the 
school shall not require an affected student to accept a 
sub-standard or educationally deficient alternative. 
H. Permitting the submission of requests for participation 
waivers, and the provision of reasonable alternatives, is intend-
ed to facilitate appropriate protection and accommodation of a 
requesting party's asserted right of conscience or exercise of 
religious freedom, and shall not be considered to be an attempt 
by a school official to endorse, promote or disparage a particu-
lar religious or non-religious viewpoint. 
R277-105-6 Student Expression 
A. A student participating in a classroom discussion, pre-
sentation, or assignment, or in a school sponsored activity, 
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shall not be prohibited from expressing personal beliefs of any 
kind nor be penalized for so doing, unless the conduct: 
( 1) unreasonably interferes with order or discipline; 
(2) threatens the well-being of persons or property; or 
(3) violates concepts of civility or propriety appropriate in a 
school setting. 
B. Students may initiate and conduct voluntary religious 
activities or otherwise exercise the r religious freedom on 
school grounds during discretionary time. Individuals not cur-
rently enrolled as students in the school may neither conduct 
nor regularly attend the activities. School officials may neither 
conduct nor actively participate in the activities, but may be 
present as necessary to ensure proper observance of school 
rules and may limit or prohibit student activities under this 
section which: 
(1) unreasonably interfere with the ability of school offi-
cials to maintain order and discipline; 
(2) threaten the well-being of persons or property; or 
(3) violate concepts of civility or propriety appropriate in 
school setting. 
R277-105-7. Worship services and church-owned facilities 
A. Public school officers and employees may neither autho-
rize nor encourage prayer or devotional activities in connection 
with any class, program, presentation or other student activity 
which is under the control, direction, or sponsorship of a public 
school or school district. This Subsection shall not act to re-
strict student rights under R277-105-6. 
B. No school employee or student may be required to at-
tend or participate in any religious worship service, whether in 
an individual capacity or as a member of a performing group, 
regardless of where or when the service is held. No penalty 
may be assessed for failure to attend or perform in such an 
activity. 
C. Subject to the requirements of Subsection R277-105-5, 
students who are members of performing groups such as school 
choirs may be required to rehearse or otherwise perform in a 
church-owned or operated facility if the following conditions are 
met: 
(1) the performance is not part of a religious service; 
(2) the activity of which the performance is a part is nei-
ther intended to further a religious objective nor under the 
direction of a church official; and 
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(3) the activity is open to the general public. 
D. Students may voluntarily attend and perform during a 
religious service as individuals or as members of a group, pro-
vided all arrangements are made by students or non-school 
personnel. 
E. Religious activities may be conducted on the same basis 
as any other non-school activity outside of regular school hours. 
F. Subject to the requirements of R277-105-5, students 
may be required to visit church-owned facilities when religious 
services are not being conducted if the visit is intended solely 
for the purpose of pursuing permissible educational objectives 
such as those relating to art, music, architecture, or history. 
R277-105-8. Expressions of Personal Belief by Employees 
A. An employee's rights relating to voluntary religious 
practices and freedom of speech do not include proselytizing of 
any student regarding atheistic, agnostic, sectarian, religious, 
or denominational doctrine while the employee is acting in the 
employee's official capacity, nor may an employee attempt to 
use his position to influence a student regarding the student's 
religious beliefs or lack thereof. 
B. Even though acting in an official capacity, an employee 
may respond in an appropriate and restrained manner to a 
spontaneous question from a student regarding the employee's 
personal belief or perspective. Nevertheless, because of the 
special position of trust held by school employees, employees 
should exercise great caution in expressing personal religious 
beliefs or perspectives, or opinions about the rightfulness or 
wrongfulness of any other person's religious beliefs or lack 
thereof. 
R277-105-9. Mandatory Responsibilities of School Dis-
tricts. 
A. Supervision and Training 
( 1) Local school boards and their employees shall cooperate 
and share responsibilities in implementing Sections 53A-13-101 
et. seq. U.C.A. 
(2) Each local school board shall adopt and implement 
policies and training in accordance with these regulations and 
the provisions of Sections 53A-13-101 et. seq. U.C.A., to include 
the following: 
(a) the person to whom a request for waiver of participa-
tion or substitution of another activity is to be directed; 
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(b) how notice is to be given to the parent of a minor sec-
ondary student who makes a request pursuant to an exercise of 
freedom of conscience or exercise of religious freedom under 
Sections 53A-13-101.2 and 53A-13-101.3 U.C.A. (1993); 
(c) how appeals may be taken from a decision to require 
participation in any curriculum or activity after a request to 
either waive participation or allow substitution of another 
activity has been made by a parent, legal guardian or second-
ary student, including suspension of participation requirements 
until a ruling on the appeal is issued; 
(d) ensuring that no student will be compelled to partici-
pate in any curriculum or activity after a request to waive 
participation or allow substitution of another activity has been 
submitted unless it is determined that requiring the participa-
tion of that particular student is the least restrictive means 
necessary to achieve a specifically identified educational objec-
tive in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(e) ensuring that any portion of any curriculum or activity 
that is repeatedly alleged to interfere with the rights of con-
science or exercise of religious freedom of students, parents or 
legal guardians shall be evaluated to determine whether the 
educational objectives could be achieved by less intrusive 
means. 
